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Employée Control 
and Discipline 
Patterns and Priorities 
David E. Dimick 
This study is directed to the issue ofwhat détermines 
the importance of an offence. Two types of characteristics 
were examined: the offence itself and several aspects of 
the organizations involved. It is possible to compare some 
of the results obtained hère with a survey of U.S. com-
pares (BNA, 1973). 
Control and discipline reflect one side of an employer's concern 
with employée behaviour. The other side, work performance, has been 
a fréquent subject of empirical investigations and has been subject 
to extensive conceptual analysis, as well. In many organizations, 
différent types of reward Systems are used for thèse différent objectives. 
Work performance can be encouraged through intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards such as récognition and approval, raises, bonuses, and the 
incréments in status and influence which accompany promotion. 
Unacceptable behaviour may elicit négative sanctions — warnings, 
reprimands, suspensions, discharge. Some of thèse sanctions hâve been 
used in attempts to increase performance. Research has shown a 
disappointing record for such attempts (e.g., Likert, 1967; Kay, Meyer, 
and French, 1965). Such négative sanctions may hâve the effect of 
providing a «floor» (a minimum level) for acceptable performance, 
but hâve been quite limited in their capacity to raise that floor. 
Much of what has previously been written about control and 
discipline has been presented from a normative point of view, ad-
vocating approaches which range from traditional (Black, 1970) to 
«progressive» (Huberman, 1964) to «discipline by objectives» (Odior-
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ne, 1971). Another set of efforts hâve been essentially descriptive 
in nature. They portray the approach to discipline which has been used 
in various organizations. Such présentations (see Sadler and Horst, 
1972; Huberman, 1975; Wollenberger, 1973 as examples) frequently 
combine an explicit or implicit advocacy along with the descriptions 
of the Systems in use. 
Some previous research has attempted to explain variations in 
control and discipline procédures. Boise (1965) studied city employées 
in Philadelphia and found that discipline was more severe when the 
offending employée was seen as not being crucial to the work of the 
unit. Rosen and Jerdee (1974) found that the severity of recommend-
ed discipline in a séries of hypothetical situations was positively related 
to the négative conséquences of the behaviour involved, not just the 
behaviour alone. They also found that penalties were more severe for 
persons of lower organizational rank and for persons described as 
marginal (as opposed to «exceptional») in their talents, given the same 
infraction. Other research has shown that the emotional state of the 
supervisor and the manner of the subordinate (hostile or uncooperative) 
moderate the intensity of the discipline applied (Goodstadt and Kipnis, 
1970; Kipnis, Silverman and Copeland, 1973). Evidence from a study 
by Shaak and Schwartz (1973) indicated that managers at higher organi-
zational levels recommended more severe penalties for a set of hypo-
thetical offences than did managers at lower levels. The same study 
also found that safety issues brought on the strongest response (i.e., 
penalty). 
In short, the previous analysis of employée discipline has been 
largely normative and descriptive. The empirical work which has been 
done has focused primarily on the characteristics of the individuals 
(employée or the employée's supervisor) and relatively little on the 
offense. Frequently thèse studies used hypothetical situations and asked 
various people how they would respond if confronted with the events 
described. 
The study reported hère was directed to the issue of what déter-
mines the importance of an offence. Two types of characteristics were 
examined : the offence itself, and several aspects of the organizations 
involved. It is possible to compare some of the results obtained hère 
with a survey of U.S. companies (BNA, 1973). To our knowledge, 
there has been no similar study of Canadian employers. Comparisons 
between the two (the BNA and this investigation) will be presented 
in a subséquent section of this paper. 
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Both formai and non-formal means are used to control employée 
behaviour. Spoken reprimands, the tone of voice, and various non-
verbal forms of communication are used and are frequently effective 
in enforcing standard practices of many kinds. Even such areas as 
how one can use one's time on the job when work is slack (does one 
hâve to look busy?) frequently become a matter of «common law» 
which may vary with the supervisor or the department in question. 
Such controls are sufficient for many employées much of the time. 
However, there are some areas which are subject to more explicit 
régulation in many organizations. This analysis is concerned with thèse 
kinds of employée behaviour. Specifically, the foliowing question is 
raised: what unacceptable behaviours are of such high and uniform 
importance in an organization that they are proscribed by formai rules ? 
PROCEDURE 
A wide range of personnel policies were examined in a survey 
of twenty companies. The companies were selected to represent a cross-
section of middle and large-sized employers in the private sector. 
Thèse companies ranged widely in size and industry, and represented 
ail major régions of the country. (See Table 1.) Part of this survey 
specifically asked about the control and discipline of employées. 
Questions were asked of both personnel specialists and selected Une 
managers as to whether the company had rules which applied to a 
number of possible offences. 
Respondents were asked whether the organization had explicit 
rules applying to the areas listed in Table 2a. Although some organiza-
tions applied such rules to managerial and professional employées, 
the interviews with the Une managers suggested that thèse rules were 
really used as explicit criteria for discipline with non-managerial em-
ployées only. The results of this study should be interpreted in that 
light. Other employées are usually handled much more flexibly. 
Data from the BNA (1973) survey hâve been used to provide a 
comparison with the results of this study. The comparisons are based 
on a similar, though not identical, list of possible areas in which rules 
may exist. Their standard for the existence of a rule (Table 2a.) was 
some what more limiting than in the current study,- leading to a smaller 
percentage of organizations in that study having «raies». In comparing 
the stnctness of enforcement (Table 2b) the data from the BNA survey 
are presented in terms of the penalties imposed after various répétitions 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Characteristics 
A. Company Size 
1. Number of Employées Number of Companies 
400 — 1,000 4 
1,000— 5,000 5 
5,000 — 10,000 5 
10,000 — 60,000 6 
2. Annual Sales (in 000,000's) 
$ 30 — 100 6 
100— 500 7 
500 — 1,000 3 
1,000 —2,500 4 
B. Industry 
1. Primary Sector 
(Resource Extraction & Processing) 
4 
2. Secondary Sector 
(Manufacturing, Food Processing) 
8 
3. Tertiary Sector 
(Insurance, Banking, Retailing, 
Transportation) 
8 
C. Location (Head Office) 
1. Atlantic Provinces 1 
2. Québec 4 
3. Ontario 11 
4. Prairie Provinces 1 
5. British Columbia 3 
of an offence. The current study approached the same issue but found 
that the respondents could not reply with that level of précision. Thus 
the posture of the company was summarized with a four point rating 
scale. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The most common areas for formai régulation are those dealing 
with being présent for (and capable of) work. Nineteen of twenty 
companies had formai rules dealing with absenteeism — how much 
was permissable, procédures for notification when it occurred, and in 
many cases a procédure for médical certification was speciiied if the 
absence was for reasons of illness or injury. Tardiness was the subject 
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TABLE 2A 
Proportions of Companies with Rules in Various Areas 
AU (BNA1) By Size By Industry SecU 
Companies Moderate/ Primary/Secondai 
Large Tertiary 
1. Absence from Work 95 (55) 90 100 100 100 88 
2. Lateness ; early departure 85 (52) 80 90 100 100 62 
3. Use of Alcohol or drugs 
affecting performance 85 (48) 80 90 75 88 88 
4. Insubordination 65 (45) 60 70 50 100 32 
5. Safety Infractions 65 (40) 60 70 50 100 38 
6. Dress ; appearance 65 (-) 60 70 50 50 88 
7. Length of work breaks 60 (52) 50 70 50 62 62 
8. « Horseplay » 50 (44) 40 60 50 88 12 
9. Leaving Worksite during 
workday 45 (44) 40 50 50 88 0 
10. Sleeping during working 
hours 30 (39) 30 30 50 50 0 
11. Personal Use of the 
téléphone 25 (-) 30 20 25 25 25 
12. Unnecessary conversation 10 (-) 10 10 0 25 0 
1
 From Table 3 of the BNA survey (1973). 
of régulation in seventeen companies while workbreak duration and 
leaving the work site were regulated in twelve and nine companies, 
respectively. 
Alcohol and/or drug abuse were the subjects of fréquent régulation. 
The unanimous opinion of those interviewed was that the concern was 
for the impact of such actions on work effectiveness. If the alcohol 
or drug abuse was not reflected in poor work or seen to be obvious, 
the rules weren't applicable. 
There were ten pairs of companies in this survey, each pair 
containing a large and a moderate-size organization in a particular 
industry. «Industry sector» refers back to the catégories in Table 1. 
Thus, the further breakouts on Table 2a reflect the patterns among 
thèse (size and sector) sub-groups of companies. The variations aren't 
notable, with the exception of the tertiary sector which less frequently 
had such législation (62% of companies) as opposed to the primary 
and secondary sectors in which 100% companies surveyed had a rule. 
Though the sample is relatively small, rules dealing with attendance 
and intoxication appear to be more fréquent in Canadian companies 
than with the U.S. employers covered in the BNA survey. 
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Infractions of safety rules and horseplay were specified formally 
as being unacceptable in roughly half of the companies. The existence 
of safety rules in sixty-five percent of this sample should not lead one 
to infer that the other thirty-five percent of the employers had a flippant 
attitude toward employée safety. Rather, most of those companies 
which were involved in industries where there were significant physical 
hazards had written safety rules, as can be seen from the breakdowns. 
Service sector companies (insurance companies, banks and so forth) 
tended not to hâve anything more complex than tire drill procédures. 
Similarly, horseplay rules were foimd in companies (such as 
those in the méat packing industry) where such actions represented 
a significant danger. 
The issue of insubordination was the subject of formai rules in 
thirteen of twenty companies in this survey. To hâve rules prohibiting 
insubordination is to underline the importance of social regularity and 
control. The dramatically lower frequency of rules regarding insubor-
dination in the tertiary sector is noteworthy. The fact that most of the 
employées in thèse companies were not unionized coincides with the 
prédominance of white-collar jobs. 
Either of thèse two factors could account for the results: the 
union présence by making it necessary to legitimize sanctions against 
insubordination, or the job mix by influencing the number of situations 
in which employées are inclined to be insubordinate. 
The basic reality of being an employée is that one is subordinate. 
The uniform expectations of employées therefore seem to dérive from 
the social requirements of a work organization : being présent and 
capable of working, and subordinating one s behaviour to hierarchical 
control. Certainly there is a logical link between the technical needs 
of the organization and social requirements they impose. But it also 
is plausible that thèse derived social needs may become functionally 
autonomous. That is, the means may in fact become an end in them-
selves. The résistance to flextime in companies where it subsequently 
works well is an example of such a social requirement (fixed hours of 
work) which may hâve become institutionalized even after the original 
need had diminished. 
A number of other possible offenses were survey éd. Though 
relatively unimportant to the overall sample, such things as leaving 
the worksite during the work day and sleeping during working hours 
were substantial concerns in the secondary and primary industry 
companies. 
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The BNA survey generally reflects less variation across possible 
offenses. Some of the différences between the results of the présent 
survey and the U.S. based survey may be due to methodology and 
the sample size in the présent study. Some of it may reflect différent 
patterns in employment relationships in the two countries. 
What do thèse findings suggest? It is clear from thèse results 
that two important conditions of employment are being présent and 
submitting to the authority of designated superiors. While thèse con-
ditions are implicit in most conventional organizations, it is instructive 
that thèse expectations are also institutionalized in the form of rules. 
What this shows is that thèse expectations apply throughout the 
organization, that they are not intended to be subject to local arran-
gements. 
It is possible to confuse the existence of the rule with the im-
portance of violating that rule. Many rules exist simply to provide 
a non-arbitrary standard for supervisory personnel to apply. It removes 
them from the responsibility of having made the rule and therefore 
from some of the antagonism associated with it when the rule is applied. 
To obtain a better appraisal of the importance of an offence, enforced 
procédures were discussed with both the personnel représentatives 
and selected line managers. Each rule was assessed as to the severity 
of sanctions which would be imposed when a violation took place. 
A four-category System was used to classify company posture; it is 
described in a footnote to Table 2b. 
Strongest sanctions applied to safety, horseplay, insubordination 
and alcohol or drug interférence with work. More moderate sanctions 
were applied to absenteeism and other actions which resulted in people 
working less than the full time specified. 
Thus, the results suggest that the companies included in this 
study reacted most vigorously when organizational authority was 
directly challenged and when unsafe acts were committed. They reacted 
less emphatically when the infractions occurred around issues of attend-
ance and being présent for the expected length of time. 
The BNA survey (1973) had no question precisely comparable 
to the one asked in this survey. However, it was possible to use some 
very detailed information about penalties to get a rough indication of 
the comparisons between the two samples. Those offenses which 
were most severely penalized in this survey (ranked " 1 " through "4") 
also tended to resuit in suspension or discharge sooner, than that 
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TABLE 2b 
Average Severity of Punishment, by Type of Offense 
Total S ample 
(BNA***) 
!. Insubordination 3.1(1) 
2. Safety Régulation 
Infractions 2.9 (2) 
3. "Horseplay" 2.8 (2) 
4. Use of Alcohol or drugs 
affecting performance 2.7(1) 
5. Absence from work 2.3 (3) 
6. Lateness ; early departure 2.1(3) 
7. Length of work breaks 2.0 (3) 
8. Leaving work during 
the work day 1.7(2) 
By Company By Industry Sector 
Size Primary/Secondary/ 
Moderate/Large Tertiary 
3.1/3.1 
2.8/3.0 
2.4/3.2 
2.6/2.8 
2.2/2.6 
2.2/1.9 
1.8/2.2 
1.2/2.3 
2.3/3.3/3.0 
2.7/3.0/**** 
2.3/3.0/**** 
2.3/2.9/2.5 
2.3/2.4/1.8 
2.3/2.0/2.5 
1.7%1.8/2.3 
1.5/2.0/**** 
* The nature of sanctions for rule infractions in four areas reportée! in Table 
2a were reported to be so variable as to make impossible to identify a typical penalty. 
Thèse rules hâve not been included in this table. 
** After discussions with personnel specialists and Une managers companies were 
rated on the strietness of their enforcement as follows : 
1 = Loose application of rule 
2 = Moderate application 
3 = Strong application 
4 = Very strict application 
Operationally, a «1» meant sanctions were rarely imposed, «2» meant 
that sanctions were imposed but not to the point of discharge, «3» meant that full 
sanctions were imposed, and «4» meant that discharge was considered and sometimes 
used even in the event of a « first offence ». 
*** The BNA survey (1973) asked about typical penalties. Respondents reported 
whether warnings, suspensions or discharges were used at the lst, 2nd, 3rd or 4th offence. 
The number tabled hère indicate the occurrence of the offence (lst, 2nd or 3rd) at which 
the majority of the employers would use a suspension or a discharge rather than a warn-
ing. The more serious the offence, the earlier the more severe penalties. 
**** Indicates that 75% or more of the companies in the category indicated did-
not hâve any clearly identified penalty for rule infraction of the kind indicated. 
offences ranked lower in this survey. Thus, there is a gênerai cor-
respondance between those results and the survey reported hère. 
The size and industry sector breakdown of the results reported 
hère suggest that large companies and those in secondary manufacturing 
tend to hâve generally stronger penalties than is the case in smaller 
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companies or in other sectors. Thèse différences are not completely 
consistent across types of offences and are generally not very large. 
It should be noted that when the managers and personnel special-
ists were asked to identify other areas in which rules existed, no area 
of régulation except one was mentioned by more than one or two of 
them. The area which did arise in several interviews as not having 
been mentioned in our list could best be categorized as employée 
honesty. In some situations the rule was formai; in other situations 
it was simply understood that misappropriating company resources was 
prohibited. This concern arose especially in cases where there were 
portable and valuable products or tools. 
The preceding analysis reflects the pattern of rules and enforce-
ment of the "typical" company in this survey and to some major 
subsets of the sample as those rules apply to spécifie acts or types 
of actions. However, it does not give much indication as to whether 
the companies in the study were uniform or varied in their approach. 
It is possible to state that the companies were quite variable : some 
with many rules, some with few, some far stricter than others. An 
analysis was conducted to détermine whether company characteristics 
or employée characteristics were significantly associated with différent 
patterns of rules and rule enforcement. To do this, two indexes were 
developed for each company from the same data used in developing 
Tables 2a and 2b. 
One index was the number of areas in which a company had ex-
plicit rules. The second index was the typical severity of punishment, 
across ail rules. For this second index, the values on which Table 2b 
was based were used. That is, the "typical" severity of penalties 
imposed was calculated for each company by taking the mean of the 
enforcement indices for ail areas where the employer had a formai 
policy. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
It is plausible to predict that larger companies would be more 
"formai" than smaller companies, that they would hâve more rules.* 
The supposed impersonality of such organizations might also be reflected 
in stricter enforcement of rules and régulations. Neither of thèse two 
patterns developed in this sample. Using both annual revenue and 
number of employées as indications of size, corrélation coefficients 
* Richard H. HALL's discussion of formalization and its relationship to orga-
nization size is a useful élaboration of this notion. See his Formai Organizations: 
Structure and Process, 2nd éd., pp. 116-119 and 152-180. 
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TABLE 3 
Corrélations Between Company Characteristics and 
The Rules Governing Employée Behaviour 
Number of areas 
subject to rules 
I Indicators of Company Size 
A. Annual Revenue - . 1 3 
B. Number of Employées .20 
Il Indicators of Technology-Workforce 
Characteristics 
A. Percent with High School Completion - .82* 
B. Percent less than 30 years old - . 4 8 * 
C. Number of Production Workers .60* 
D. Percent Maie - . 14 
E. Percent who are union members .64* 
III Indicators of Business Activity Patterns 
A. Revenue Per Employée - .50* 
B. Product Diversity .53* 
* p < .05 
were computed with the rules index and the enforcement index. The 
magnitude of the corrélations were small ; none of the four coefficients 
was statistically significant. 
Thus, there was no support for a relationship between organiza-
tion size, on one hand, and either the number of regulated areas or 
the severity of sanctions, on the other. This raises the possibility 
that thèse indexes may not be related to organizational characteristics 
at ail. However, further analyses did identify some interesting patterns 
with regard to technology/work force and business activity patterns. 
The "technology" of the companies was reflected in a number 
of workforce characteristics. The relationship between control and 
discipline measures and workforce characteristics is reflected in the 
corrélations reported in Table 3. There was a very strong négative 
relationship (r = -.82) between the percentage of employées who 
had completed high school and the number of areas which were 
governed by formai rules. A similar resuit was obtained v/hen the 
percentage of the employées who were less than thirty was considered 
(r = -.48). The number of production workers in a company was 
positively associated (r = .60) with the number of rules, as was the 
percentage of employées who were union members (r = .64). 
Severity of 
Sanctions 
- . 07 
.01 
- .08 
- .04 
- . 07 
.66* 
- .14 
- . 23 
- . 17 
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It is possible, then, to characterize companies having extensive 
rules which prohibit various kinds of employée behaviour as being 
employers of relatively less educated, older and preponderantly produc-
tion (i.e., "blue-collar") employées. Such a pattern of régulation may be 
the resuit of many factors. It may hâve been that the technical and 
social equilibrium implied by thèse rules is more important to blue 
collar organizations — that the workflow requires greater inter-
dependence and therefore more explicit control. It may also resuit from 
traditional attitudes and management practice. Managers in the indus-
tries may hâve developed in a context of time or "culture" in which 
explicit rules were numerous and thought to be important. A third pos-
sibility is that employées such as those in the profile above are less 
integrated (more alienated) than those with more éducation and white 
collar jobs. 
The fact that the proportion of employées belonging to a union 
was strongly related to the number of regulated areas suggest that both 
the second and third explanations are quite plausible. The présence of 
unions may tend to institutionalize adversary relationships and fre-
quently nécessitâtes more formai modification of the employment rela-
tionship. Managers who hâve spent their careers in this kind of orga-
nization may think it more necessary to hâve rules than managers 
from other backgrounds. It is also plausible that institutionalized ad-
versary patterns contribute to or reinforce feelings of aliénation. Given 
the small sample, any generalization must be cautions. But the strong 
ties between work force characteristics and the use of rules is a central 
finding which invites further study. 
Only one organizational variable was significantly related to the 
severity of enforcement. This variable was the percentage of men in 
the workforce. The greater the percentage of men, the more severe were 
the sanctions which could be imposed. This may hâve been a resuit of 
the occupation mix — predominantly maie work forces being subject to 
stricter discipline because of the work they were doing. Yet the near-
zero corrélation with other workforce characteristics raises the possib-
ility that it may hâve been the expérience and expectations of em-
ployers with maie employées which was the more important fact. 
The business activity patterns of the companies suggest that 
technology may rival démographie factors in determining the extent of 
formai rules. The significant négative corrélation (r = -.50) between 
revenue per employée and the number of rules suggests that highly 
labour intensive technologies (low revenue per employée) tend to hâve 
many rules while technologies which are less labour intensive resuit in 
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fewer former rules. It may also be that labour intensive technologies 
require a less educated workforce, and the rules are a direct response 
to the workforce. The under-lying factor in either case would still 
seem to be the technology of work. 
The product diversity of a company was positively associated 
with the extent of its use of rules in controlling employée conduct 
(r = .53). This suggests that rules are a way of maintaining uniformity 
over a widely varying set of circumstances. It is reasonable to suggest 
that rules are used to control employée behaviour in situations where 
"obvious" norms or informai control is less plausible. Certainly, 
multiple locations would be less susceptible to the "natural" spreading 
of consistent norms. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Description and admonition hâve characterized much of previous 
writing about control and discipline of employées. Those empirical 
analyses which hâve been reported hâve typically focused on the 
influence of personal characteristics of the supervision or on employée 
characteristics (length of service, level, "indispensability"), as factors 
affecting disciplinary décisions. 
On study (GNA, 1973) covered some of the same areas as the 
survey reported hère. The proportion of companies in this sample with 
explicit rules in certain areas (absenteeism, tardiness, alcohol abuse, for 
example) was much higher than in the BNA survey. In other discipline 
areas, the proportions of companies with rules was found roughly 
similar. 
The strictness of enforcement in both this survey and in that one 
(done in the U.S.) showed similar patterns. The more severe penalties 
were for dangerous acts ("horseplay", intoxication, safety infractions) 
and for insubordination. The issues of attendance and punctualiity were 
less likely to incur suspension or discharge penalties at the first or 
second offence. 
Corrélation analysis relating employée discipline to organiza-
tional characteristics was used to identify some tentative reasons for 
the considérable variation in discipline procédures. The use of formai 
rules was associated with labour intensive technologies with diverse 
products and/or services. Employées tended to be older, less educated, 
and more predominantly "blue-collar" and unionized. 
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Only one company characteristic (the proportion of employées 
who were maie) was associated with the severity of sanctions imposed. 
The fact that other employée characteristics (level of éducation, extent 
of union membership) did not correlate significantly with the typical 
severity of sanctions reduces the probability that being maie was 
simply an indicator of some other circumstance. It is an interesting 
resuit, suggesting that more severe sanctions are more necessary or 
appropriate with maie employées, at least in the sample companies on 
which this survey was based. 
The results of the study are generally consistent with the BNA 
survey. The patterns and priorities in disciplinary rules suggest that 
certain issues are seen as requiring a relatively uniform approach 
throughout an organization. Attendance and punctuality were subject 
to fréquent législation, although penalties for violations were initially 
less severe. Safety infractions and issues of insubordination were less 
frequently subject to rules, except in the secondary industry sector, 
where they were very common. However, the strictness of enforce-
ment was quite high. 
It is prématuré to offer a gênerai explanation of what shapes the 
patterns of disciplinary practices. The results of this survey can be 
understood to suggest two broad factors which should be explicitly 
examined. First is technology. Those work situations where physical 
dangers exist seem to resuit in both explicit rules and strong enforce-
ment. The second is organizational necessity. Rules and enforcement 
applied for insubordination, attendance, punctuality and alcohol abuse 
are one reflection of a need to hâve a behaviourally predictable organiza-
tion. The variation of employée characteristics and company charac-
teristics with the extent of explicit rules suggests that situations which 
threaten organization control and coordination (e.g., unions, géographie 
dispersion) are met, at least in part, through discipline procédures. 
Understanding the patterns and priorities in control and discipline 
are important to understanding the employment relationship more 
completely. Hopefully it is an area which will receive more attention in 
the future. 
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Autorité et discipline dans l'entreprise: 
les modèles et les priorités 
L'exercice de l'autorité et de la discipline montre un aspect des préoccupations 
des employeurs au sujet de la conduite des employés. L'autre côté, qui consiste dans 
le rendement au travail, a fait l'objet d'études approfondies. On a cependant accordé 
beaucoup moins d'attention aux questions d'autorité et de discipline. Dans nombre 
d'entreprises, on a utilisé diverses mesures pour apprécier le rendement de l'employé: 
bonis, majorations de salaire, avancement, etc. 
La conduite répréhensible entraîne aussi diverses sanctions: avertissements, répri-
mandes, suspension, renvoi. Certaines de ces sanctions ont été utilisées pour accroître 
le taux de rendement, mais elles ont donné de piètres résultats. 
Dans son article, l'auteur se limite à l'étude des moyens susceptibles de corriger 
les écarts de conduite. Différentes méthodes sont utilisées pour assurer l'ordre et la 
discipline. Parfois, on se contentera d'avoir recours à des remarques verbales. Dans d'au-
tres entreprises, on trouvera des règlements écrits. 
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L'auteur a poursuivi son enquête auprès des cadres et de la direction de vingt 
entreprises employant de 500 à 50,000 salariés et qui appartiennent à tous les sec-
teurs de l'activité économique. 
Le résultat de cette enquête démontre que 19 d'entre elles possèdent des règle-
ments écrits concernant l'absentéisme et, respectivement, 17, 12 et 9 concernant 
les retards, le prolongement de la pause-café et l'abandon du lieu du travail. La con-
sommation d'alcool et de drogue est aussi souvent l'objet de règlements écrits, surtout 
lorsqu'elle est de nature à affecter le rendement de l'employé. Les contraventions 
aux règles de sécurité et le jeu (horseplay) sont sanctionnées dans à peu près la moitié 
des entreprises, principalement celles où l'activité professionnelle comporte des dangers 
d'accidents. L'insubordination proprement dite faisait l'objet de règlements formels dans 
13 entreprises et les sociétés où l'on ne trouvait pas de tels règlements appartenaient 
généralement au secteur tertiaire. D'autres points faisaient aussi l'objet de règlements 
dans quelques cas comme la conversation pendant les séances de travail, la tenue ou 
l'apparence physique, l'usage du téléphone à des fins personnelles. 
De ce qui précède, l'auteur constate qu'il peut y avoir confusion entre l'existence 
d'un règlement et son application, car les règles existent souvent pour éviter l'arbitraire. 
Les règlements peuvent être appliqués d'une façon très souple, d'une manière modérée 
et, ailleurs, d'une manière sévère ou très stricte. D'une façon générale, on peut dire 
que les sanctions sont très sévères lorsqu'il y a opposition à l'utorité constituée ou que 
les normes de sécurité ne sont pas observées. On les applique avec moins de rigueur 
lorsqu'il s'agit d'assiduité et de la présence au travail. 
Outre les sujets précédents, lorsqu'il a été question d'autres sections susceptibles 
de sanctions, les intéressés ont fait référence à l'honnêteté de l'employé. 
En bref, l'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'attitude des entreprises varie 
beaucoup de l'une à l'autre. Certaines imposent des règlements plus nombreux que 
les autres et les unes se montrent plus rigoureuses que d'autres dans leur application. 
On peut aussi ajouter que la grande entreprise est plus portée à avoir des 
règlements formels que la société de moindre importance. On remarque que les entre-
prises, qui ont les règlements les plus détaillés et les plus sévères, sont, en règle 
générale, plus anciennes, et possèdent une main-d'œuvre principalement formée de cols 
bleus. La raison peut en être que le processus de fabrication requiert une plus grande 
interdépendance, qu'il s'agit là d'attitudes traditionnelles et que les cols bleus se sentent 
plus aliénés que les autres catégories de travailleurs. Là où il existe des syndicats, les 
règlements écrits sont plus courants, ce qui provient peut-être de la tendance des 
syndicats à institutionnaliser les règlements par le biais des conventions collectives. 
D'une façon générale, on peut retenir que les règlements écrits sont nécessaires là où 
des méthodes moins formelles ne sont pas aussi efficaces. Un autre fait à souligner, 
c'est que plus la proportion des hommes est forte au sein du personnel, plus les sanc-
tions sont rigoureuses. On remarque aussi que là où les techniques de travail sont le 
plus développées, les sanctions sont moins strictes, possiblement parce que les employés 
ont une meilleure formation. 
Dans l'ensemble, on peut dire que la sévérité des sanctions imposées indique que 
l'insubordination et l'inobservance des règles de sécurité sont les actes qu'on considère 
comme les plus répréhensibles tandis qu'on ne sévira contre le manque d'assiduité et la 
consommation d'alcool et de drogues que ceux-ci ont tendance à devenir chroniques. 
